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This study aims to clarify the Community Power Structure (C. P. S) in Japanese society 
through the survey of a small city with a population of thirty thousand. The focus of our study 
is Shimoda City located at a distance of about 80 miles from Tokyo in the southern part of 
the Izu-Peninsula， and well known as the site of the first American consulate that Townsend 
Harris opened in ]apan in 1856. 
Our research was conducted in November 1984 and in September 1985. We would like 
to express our appreciation to the citizens of Shimoda who permitted themselves to be inter-
viewed. We are indebted to both graduate and undergraduate students in the Department of 
Sociology at Tokyo Metropolitan University for their interest and support. 
I. Identifying the Problems 
The term “community" in Japanese means a traditional village community of about fifty 
households based on common land ownership. It used to be the lowest administrative unit of 
the Tokugawa feudal government and its basic components were not indivduals but households. 
There have been recognized two types of the village communities. In one， private landownership 
is recognized and households are ranked accordingly in a hierarchical order. The other was an 
age grade system in which people were devided by age， and males or females of younger age 
groups used to 1ive together in one large household. The village communities in the area of 
the Izuヂeninsulawhere Shimoda city is located are of the latter type. Most of the communities 
in this city area used to be fishing villages， and there were no large landowners nor large 
scale farmers. The distinction between the main and branch households is not salient to this 
area. 
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After the Meiji Restoration of 1868， the new government abolished the feudal rice tax by 
revising the land tax in 1873. While the older system of village community under the feudal 
lord's control was thus disrupted， communal regulations of farming， together with the communal 
solidarity of the members， were not broken up. The viI1age community was no longer the unit 
of rice-tax collection. Under the land tax revision of 1873， private ownership of land was fully 
recognized. And tax was now assessed on the value of land. 
In 1888 a new set of regulations on the structure and administration of cities， towns and 
villages was promulgated. Under this municipal code， several old towns and viI1ages were 
incorporated into new and larger entities. The former village was downgraded to the status of 
ham1et， now called buraku， and several burakus formed one new vil1age or town. For example， 
Suye village in Kumamoto Prefecture in 1935 was divided into eight administrative units called 
ku in most of which there were two or more hamlets (buraku). But communal problems 
pertaining to agricultural and local affai.rs continued to be settled at the buraku， and/or vi1age 
level. The communal ownership of water (irrigation)， waste land， forest and agrarian roads 
were an important basis for community life. 
Some amendments to the laws of local organization were enacted in 1921. Under the 
former laws， the qualifications for citizenship had been limited to males ouer twenty-five years 
of age who paid taxes to the city， town or viI1age and paid， inabbition， national tax of more than 
two yen to the central government. Now the national tax acquirement was dropped. In 1925 
universal suffrage of male over twenty-five of age was proclaimed. Before universal suffrage， 
voting right for the House of Representative was expanded in 1919， when direct tax eligibility 
for males was reduced from ten to three yen. 
Thus we have had two types of communities in the process of modernization. One is a 
recent administrative unit and the other a traditional autonomous unit. 
The term community in the context of this paper is an expedent， employed to refer to 
the entire area of the municipal administrative unit. What we would like to analyse ia not the 
power structure of the traditional village community but the power structure of the whole city 
administrative unit including these traditional communities which have been in transition toward 
modernization and ur 
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course， todistinguish power from authority， and control from leadership is di伍cult. 1n contrast 
to the traditional ]apanese community in which the public or political and the private or civic 
spheres were not c1early separated， itseems to be taken for granted that in the community in 
the U. S. that the two spheres are to be separated. Therefore there often have been many 
debates concerning the definition of power in the U. S. sociology. 
For example， Talcott Parsons criticized C. Wright Mil1s' zero-sum concept of power in 
his review of Mil1s' The Power Elite. Parsons， who maintains that power is rather a desirable 
commodity in the highly organized modern society， criticized Mi1ls' standpoint as based on a 
romantic and anarchic assumption of power itself being an evil. 1n our opinion， whereas 
Parsons focused mainly on personal inf1uence in the private sphere， Mil1s concerned himself with 
powe.r in the public sphere. 1n his pluralistic model against Mil1s' centralized ruling elite mode1 
through the survey of New Haven， Robert Dahl showed that there were different decision 
makers concerning different issues. 
But as G. Wil1iam Domho任 triedto show in his book Who Rules America? Dahl's 
finding of ‘pluralism' on the local level isnot Chart 1 Governing Class and Power EIite 
incompatible with the idea of a national upper 
c1ass that is a governing c1as. On the one 
hand， whereas Mi1ls denied the concept of 
ruling c1ass and replaced it with the power 
elite in the three realms of the economic， the 
political and the mi1itary， Domho妊 admitted
the existence of a governing c1ass based on 
ーー -ー--governing c1as 
-ー-欄冒トー powerelite 
-ー--t---mass
property ownership. But Domho妊alsoused the concept of the power elite and related it to a 
governing c1ass as shown in a following Chart 1. 
On a national level， the ruling or governing c1ass always co-opts the members from the 
mass. Equality of opportunity promoted by meritocratic scales in this cooptation process does 
not necessarily lead to democratization of society. But as Domhoff pointed out， this ruling elite 
model is not incompatible with the pluralistic model of local community. 
On the community leve1 power implies inf1uence in the private sphere. Also issues can 
not be solved by forces of majority as in the po1itical realm， but can only be solved by the 
integrated authority in the civic realm or consensus among citizens. It is necessary to distinguish 
between political society in which issues are decided by majority and civil society in which 
issues are decided by consnsus or hegemony showed by citizens. 
Of course， the distinction between political society and public sphere and civi1 society and 
private sphere is not substantial but analytical. As to the linkage between two， see Chart 2. 
The separation between the public and the private is one of the contradictions moderni-
zation itself has produced， but it is also great achievement and positive historical product. And 
if participant democracy or self-government should be fully realized， then the separation between 
two itself would become meaningless. Thus if we take the case of municipal government， 
citizens enter the realm of political society by voting. Under the people's sovereignty， people 
have equal po1itical rights. And by election people can send their representatives to the assembly. 
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Chart 2 Political Society and Civil Soeie士y
(power and force) 
巨日 political society 
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?
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?
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election 
co-optation 
civil society 
(private sphere) 
participation election 
5e lf-government 
(influence and consensus) 
People do not only exercise voting right as a sovereignty， but also elect their po1itical party 
leaders as a rank and file member of a party. As a citizen having professional occupation， he 
may be a part-time member of the political party. However he can elect professional political 
leaders， as the executives of a party. Also even though one may not be a member of a po1itical 
party， be can support and contribute the party. 
As far as the parliamentary or representative democracy is chosen， the government by 
bureaucracy is imperative. Bureaucracy has people's legitimate belief as a legal order. The 
power is exercised by the written rules. Also bureaucratic administration has legitimacy because 
the party that gets majority in the assembly can access the governmental power and organize 
executive staf. 
When government or executive organ once estab1ished by the majority in the assembly 
or by a elected head such as a mayor， a governor or a President， bureaucracy became a control 
apparatus， and administration staffs are co-opted from citizen according to their ability. Thus 
not to allot a portion of the function of government to less talented persons becomes imperative. 
The distinction and conjunction between political and civil society or between moment 
of force and of consensus are effective frame both at national level and at local community 
level. Distinction between public and private is rather relative and even in private organization 
the process to realize autonomnus integration from below functions as a political process from 
which leadership of a political citizen should be emergent. 
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Today we have at least two arguments concerning to a modernization theory. One is 
the argument to predict the coming of post-industrial society such as Daniel Bell. He takes a 
three-stage theory， that is pre-industrial (pre-modern)， industrial (modern) and post-industrial 
(post-modern). Another is the argument to predict the coming of ]apanese culture， i.e.， that 
the end of the stage of modernization occurs as ]apan catches up. That is the declaration of 
the ‘conquest of modernity，' and the prospect of transition from the ‘age of modernity' to the 
‘age of post-modernity.' Thus the ]apanese pattern is characterised by tendency for some 
elements of pre-industrial communities to be revitalized in the process of new group formation 
in the post-modern phase. In addition， the revitalization is facilitated by two competing positions， 
that of conservatives on one hand， and that of progressives on the other. 
This argument is congruent with the theme of the ‘return to ]apanese tradition.' For 
example， the late Prime Minister Ohira asserted that‘material civilization based on modern 
rationalism has arrived at the point of saturation. We are now shifting away from the modern 
age to the age which transcendends it away from the economy-centred age to the culture-
centred age.' 
The ‘age of culture' at the same time meanS the ‘age of local community.' There are 
two currents in these assertion. One is an ideological campaign connected with the ultra-
nationalistic mov巴ment，and the other is the citizen movement to realize democratic self-govern-
ment. To the latter regard， ]apanese political culture has an indigenous potential for so-called 
direct democracy. Until recent time， people believe that the government tels the people what 
to do， but now it turns the other way around. 
11. The Historical Background 
In 1896 Shimoda became a town and in 1955 it incorporated with neighbor five villages. 
There are several hamets in each five former villages as we show following. 
Former Town 1 2 3 4 5 6 
and Vi1lages Shimoda Inousawa Inazusa Shirahama Hamazaki Asahi 
(Former Town) 
1 Hongo 1 Suhara 1 Harada 1 Susaki 10hkamo 
2 Naka 2 Yokoyama 2 Nagata 2 Kakizaki 2 Kisami 
Hamlets 3 Kouchi 3 Minosaku 3 Itado 3 Sotoura 3 Tauchi 
4 Tatuno 4 Kazono 
5 Rendaiji 5 Ohuchi 
6 Ohsawa 
In 1971 Shimoda city was born. Total population is thirty one thousands in 1980釦 d
in an紅白 offormer town there live ten thousands. 
In this area， we had three traditional vi1lage communities， 1) mountain villages， 2) fishing 
villages and 3) semi-fishing and semi-agricultural villages. Before World War I， each hamlet 
had communal land which sh訂 edby formal households in the community. These households 
had responsibility of allotments of al expenses. The village community was divided into kumi 
which consisted of several household communities. In kumi， there were young male's and 
female's kumi. Young people whose age were fifteen to thirty lived together in one large 
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household which existed in each kumi. Y oung males were expected to become a member of a 
fire brigade， tohelp villagers in a case of emergency and to assist funeral and marriage cere-
mony of villagers. 
In former Shimoda town there has been a good harbor and once was a center for marine 
transportation since 1636， when Tokugawa government had set 0伍ce. In Edo period， there 
developed ship building business and were meant ship c紅 penters. But since Meiji period， 
transportation by rail roads became dominant， and after the Tokaido line from Tokyo to Osaka 
was set， the harbor became less and less important. However as corresponding to the shift 
from a boat to steamer in Meiji， new ship building business was established in 1898 with new 
technology by local capital. The ship building industry and re1ated industries were main ones 
in Shimoda town at that time. 
Before the rail road from Ito to Shimoda was established in 1961， the main transportation 
Table 1 Household Menbers by Industry 1954 
All industries 
AgricuIture 
Indutry 
Forestry and hunting 
Fisheries and aquaculture 
Mining 
Construction 
Manufacturing 
Wholesale and retail 
Finace and insurande 
Real estate business 
Communication and public utilities 
Services 
Government 
No jobs 
Household Menbers 
100.0%(8920) 
1.6 
0.2 
60.3 
0.0 
8.5 
17.5 
22.1 
1.5 
0.1 
8.4 
22.7 
6.7 
4.6 
had been bus that owned private1y by 
the business whose head 0血cewas 
located in Shimoda town. In the north-
ern part of the city there is a hot 
spring source from which hot water 
is drawn. There has been hot spring 
hotels and inns in the central place of 
the town. There were 32 hotels and 
inns in 1960. The population of Shi-
moda town by household and by indus-
try in 1954 is shown Table 1. The 
industries which most households in 
Shimoda town pursued were services 
(22.7%) and wholesale and retail 
(22.1) and manufacturing (17.5). Upon 
such economic base the conflicts of 
political power were developed at the time before the Izukyu rail road was constructed. Kinds 
of the old established family which people regarded as the most privileged were 1) families of 
main traditional ship agencies， 2) families held and managed main hote1s and inns， 3) families 
held and managed a ship building company， 4) families held and managed a bus company. 
Especially the presidents of these two big companies in Shimoda town at that time had large 
economic influences. Also fami1ies of these two executives were relatives and both had career 
of mayor. 
After the Izukyu line was opened to tra伍cin 1961， the industrial structure in Shimoda 
city changed great1y. The population of Shimoda city area by industry from 1960 to 1980 is 
shown in Table 2. In 1965， after four years from the opening of a rail road， population of 
agriculture and forestry and fisheries dec1ined from 35. 5% to 23.9% in contrast with the fact 
that population of services increased from 17.5% to 25.6% and that of wholesale and retail 
from 16.8% to 20.3%. These trends have continued in these days. In 1980 population of 
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Table 2 Emploied Persons by Industry (perccent) 
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 
All Iudustries 100(13339) 100(14003) 100(16037) 100(16176) 100(15522) 
AgricuItue 28.4 18.7 14.0 8.2 6.2 
Forestry and Hunting 2.3 1.0 0.3 3.2 0.3 
Fisheries and Aquaculiuhe 4.8 4.3 3.3 2.8 3.0 
Mining 1.1 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.1 
Coustruction 9.2 8.5 8.5 10.0 9.1 
Manufacturing 6.3 6.6 7.3 7.1 7.5 
Wholesale and Retail 16.8 20.3 23.3 24.3 26.0 
Finance and Insurance 1.1 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.2 
Real Estate Bussines 0.1 0.2 6.0 7.5 6.6 
Communication and Transportation 7.0 8.5 8.5 7.3 7.1 
Electricity， Gas and Water Services 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 
Services 17.4 25.6 28.2 33.1 33.1 
Goverment 4.8 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.8 
agriculture is 6. 2 % and that of fisheries is 3. 0 % and whereas that of services is 33. 1 % and 
that of wholesale and retail is 26.0%. 
As a rail road was open， there had been rapid growth of population to come to Shimoda 
as a sightseeing tour. People come to Shimoda for sea bathing in summer and for hot spring 
bathing in other seasons. Izu-Peninsula had been a place for honeymoon before it was replaced 
by Hawaii. In 1962， there were double tourists as compared with them in 1961， and number 
of tourists increased 6. 5 times of 1961 in 1970. As corresponding to the increasing number of 
tourists， the number of accomodations was also increased. Hot spring hotels and inns increased 
from 32 in 1960 to 61 in 1971. Simplified accommodations which are managed by some ordinary 
house holders were 50 in the city area in 1960 and 230 in 1970. 
Izukyu Rail Company by which the new line was constructed has developed Shimoda as 
a tourist city. This company belongs the Tokyu Group which has been involved in extended 
transportation and tourist operations such as department stores， rail roads， hotels， buses and 
others. It undertook the development of tourist， bus and hotel industries in Shimoda city and 
constructed thousand resort facilities. The old families have been ruined by competition with 
companies of the Tokyu Group. Owners and managers of hotels and inns， and those of the 
bus company who had power in the city before the opening of the rai1road lost their power 
and influences. Fami1ies of the owner of the only remaining ship bui1ding company had 
transferred its management rights to a major national fishing corporation. 
So-called ‘oi1 shock' in 1973 was a symbol of the decline of Japanese economic growth 
which was sustained throughout the 1960s， and a series of earthquakes in 1974， 1977 and 1978 
damaged the image of Shimoda as a tourist city. The peak of population of Shimad city area 
was 32， 040 in 1976. The population has since been declining and is down to 30， 623 in 1985. 
And now revitalization of Shimoda city is pursued especially by younger generations. Business 
in Shimoda has become dull and Izukyu which once held relativly important sway in the 
economy of Shimoda su鉦eredheavy investment losses in real estate in the wake of the oil 
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crisis in 1973， making up the begining of a steady decline of the economic position of the 
Tokyu Group in the peninsula. Another service-transportation conglomerate， Seibu group， has 
subsequently stepped into pick up the slack， bringing in more fashinable seaside sports such as 
yachting， surfing and wind surfing. Playing upon the initial letters of the acronyms of the two 
rival conglomerate， which respectibly spells ‘East (TO-)' and ‘West (SEI-)，' loca!s !ike to 
speak of the East-West confrontation. 
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Who Has Power in the Community? 
Before examination of the power structure of Shimoda， we wou!d first of al !ike to give 
some basic information about politica! a妊airsin the city. As shown in Tab!e 3， the majority 
of the members of the city assembly are members of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). LDP has 
occupied 20 seats in every election. In 1971 and 1975 nonpartisan members held five and al 
of them were constituents of conservative elements almost indistinguishable from the LDP. 
Therefore in 1971 only two members of the Komei Party (KMP) and one member of the 
Communist Party (JCP) formed a counterforce against the establishment， and both of the two 
parties increased their members in the assembly each by one from 1971 to 1975. Since 1979 
there has been no nonpartisan members in the assembly， and in 1979 the three parties increased 
their members; Democratist Socilist Party (DSP) added three， Socialist Party (JSP) one and 
11. 
LDP one. 
Since 1983 the total membership of the assembly has decreased from thirty to twenty-six， 
and from that total of four， LDP lost two， KMP two and JSP one in 1983. In 1984 a DSP 
assembly man Mr. Iketani， ran for the mayoralty and won. At an off year election， a member 
of the LDP won. Therefore， at present， the distribution of the membership of the assembly 
is; LDP 20， DSP 2， KMP 2， JCP 2. Among LDP members， there have been two factions 
split according to their connections to individual Diet members. 
As to the mayor's election， the candidates for election and the numbers of votes they got 
from 1968 to 1984 are shown in Table 4. As one can see， in each election it was a close race. 
Mayoralty had heen held by Mr. Ishii from 1968 to 1976. 1976 Mr. Aoki from old Shimoda， 
defeated Mr. Nagatomo from Hamazaki by small margin， and in 1980 Mr. Aoki was reelected 
defeating ex・mayorMr. Ishi. It is very interesting to note that when a mayor tried to run in 
Members of the Cily Assembly by Partie目
1896 1983 1979 1875 1971 
Table 3 
Libera! Democrtic Party (LDP) 20 i「に「にh恥加Factiω叫叫ctiいFaction B 8 
Neutra! 4 
2 
2 
O 
2 
O 
26 
19 
。 。 ?
?????
??
21 
? 。 ? ?
?
，???
? ? ?
20 
????
，??
??
。 。
21 
???
???
? ??， ? ?
Democratic Socia!ist Party (DSP) 
Komei Party (KMP) 
Soca!ist Party (JSP) 
Communist Party CJCP) 
Nonpartisan 
Tota! 
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the next election as a LDP member， rival 
candidates also in LDP called themselves non-
partisans. In 1984 Mr. Iketani calling himself 
a nenpartisan but actually a DSP member， won 
the mayoralty. There was only a difference of 
486 voter. It was the nrst time that the in-
cumbent mayor was defeated and a candidate 
from the opposite party won. This caused the 
appointment of the main posts in the city 
government such as the dupty mayor and treas-
urer to be delayed by a veto in the assembly. 
We show the numb巴rsof votes in the Shimoda 
city election of each candidate for the Diet in 
1983， as a reference in Table 5. 
To discover who has power in the com-
munity we gath釘 edthe informations from about 
three hundred persons through interviews and 
documents. Then we made preliminary lists by 
Table 4 Mayor's Eledion from 1968 to 1984 
1968 
Candidate Party Hometownd Vote 
M. Ishi LDP Inazusa 0 5，774 
T. Sano Non Shimoda X 5，254 
S. Suzuki LDP Shimoda X 5，095 
1972 
M. Ishi LDP Inazusa 0 9，226 
T. Sano Non Shimoda X 8，384 
1976 
S. Aoki LDP Shimoda 0 9，540 
1. Nagato Non Hamazaki X 9，239 
1980 
S. Aoki LDP Shimoda 010，080 
M. Ishi Non Inazusa X 7，171 
1984 
J. Iketani Non Inousawa 0 9，667 
S. Aoki LDP Shimoda X 9， 181 
sectors of political， economic and socio・culturalleaders. They were given scores by several 
informants who were asked to select important persons in each section. According to the 
Table 5 Eledion of Members of the Diet in 1983 
Candidate Party Hometown Numbers of Votes in Shimoda 
H. Kurihara LDP Mishima 02，938 
S. Saito LDP Fuij 02，105 
T. Tsuruya JCP Numazu × 492 
S. Katsumata JSP Gotenba 03，648 
R. Watanabe DSP Numazu o 2，075 
Y. Kibe LDP Ito o 3，079 
N. Sugiyama LDP Shimizu X 1，797 
scores thus obtained， a list of 134 
persons was made. About fifty politi-
cal leaders were included in the list; 
three generations of mayors， deputy 
mayors， and chief nnanciers; members 
and exmembers of the city assembly; 
local leaders of the political parties， 
chief leaders of election campaigns， 
and local labor union leaders. To 
them were added the following politi-
cians who live out side the city; a governor， members of the prefectural assembly and Diet 
members. In the economic sector are included the directors of the camber of commerce. In 
the sociocultural sector， are included 14 leaders in public education， social movernments and 
religious associations. Then we added young leaders and eccentric leaders who had never been 
any oficial positions to assess the dynamic power structure of the city. 
We made a list of 134 and were able to interview 122 persons. Most of the remaining 
12 were absent or unreachable at the time of the survey， and there were just a few who simply 
refused to cooperate. The 122 leaders were asked (1) to pick 20-30 people from among the list 
who they thought were influential in the a妊airsof Shimoda City， and then name the top 12; 
and (2) to name about 10， from among their long time acquaintances， whom they believe they 
can seek counsel from on important issues of the entire city or its districts. From among the 
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134 names in the list， 10 were deleted because they were not nominated by any of the 121 
except themselves， so the final number of names on the list is 124. A further 11 of the 124 
were deleted because they were either absent， unreachable or had not responed at the time of 
the survey (the remainder of the above 12 was not nominated). Our final sample data of 
leaders which we wi1l deal with for analysis is 113. 
Leaders who were listed in the top thirty in Question (1) were given one point. Those 
rating the ‘top 12' status as‘one of the most importatant leaders' were given additional two 
points. By totalling these points， the top of the rank was the present mayor with 200 points 
(out of a possible total of 226 points)， which means almost a1 the leaders nominated him. 
Then we calculated the weighted reputation scores which were made by giving a value to each 
point received from another leader based on their supposed position. As to the supposed 
position， the fo11owing set of equations was formulated where if one were nominated by a 
person who had a higher value in the weighted reputation scores， one could get more points. 
The value ranged from O. 00 to 1. 0. 
In Question (2)， leaders who were political consultants with the other leader were given 
one point and those considered consultants by two other leaders were given two points. If they 
accept political consultation from a1 the other leaders， they would be given 112 points. We 
had assumed that those who had high reputation scores would also be nominated by many 
persons as a political consultant， so we wanted to compare the weighted reputation score with 
the the strength of the political consultant relationships. We calculated the degree of centrality 
by modifying each point received from the other leaders by their supposed position in the 
relationships. As to the supposed position， the fo11owing set of equations were formulated 
where if one were selected by a person who was higher in the degree of cen住ality，one could 
get more points. The value would range from O. 00 to 1. 00. The co-relationship between the 
weighted reputation scores and the centrality scores is significant (0.694， p.0.001). 
Among top thirty， there are 12 political leaders， aswe indicate in the remarks in Table 
6 (No. 1， 3， 5， 8， 10， 11， 13， 15， 17， 20， 27， 28). Among the 12 persons， 4 are Diet members， 2 
members of the prefectural assembly， one is a governor， 3 are experienced mayors and 2 are 
members of the city assembl 
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Table 6 The List of the Leaders Who Are Ranked Within the Upper 38 
by Reputation Scores 
Degree of 
Centrality in 
P.C.R. NW 
Non-weighted 
Sum of Repu司
tation Scores 
Weighted Sum 
of Reputation 
Scores 
Remarks Number of Nominaters 
Rank 
Mayor 
Governor 
Member of P. A. 
Diet Member 
Diet Member 
Ex-Mayor 
Former Mayor 
Meber of C. A. 
Meber of C. A. 
?
??
??
??
???
??????????
? ???
??
? ? ?
?????????????
?? ? ? ? ?
?????
??????
? ?
???
???
? 。 。
??
???
??????????
????
? ?
??????????????
??????????
???
， 。 。 。
?
? ? ?????????????
?
????
??
?? ?????????????????????????
200 
152 
141 
140 
159 
137 
109 
109 
112 
99 
? ? ? ? ? ??
??
?
? ?
?
?? ?
??
??
? ? ? ? ? ?
?
??????
?? ? ?
? ? ?
?
?
??? ?
??
?
??
，??
??????
? ? ? ? ?
?? ?
????
?? ?
???????????????
? ? ? ? ?
????
????
?
???
?? ? ? ?
。
???
?????
??
???????
? 。
??
??
?
?
? ?? ??
???????
?
????????
? 。
?
? 。 ? 。 。
??
? ? ?
??
??
， ? 。 ，
???
? ?
?
??
?
?????
?
???????
?????
?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
??
???????
?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
??
?? ? ? ? ? ?
???
。 ?
??
? ?
??
，? ? ? ? ?
? 『
?? ? ? ? ?
? ?
? ? ? ? ?
?
? ? ? ? ? ??
?
? ?
??
? ?
? ? ?
?
??
?? ? ? ? ?
?
。 ， ? 。 ， ? 。 ， ? 。 ，
? ?
，?
????
?
?
???
，????
??。?? ? ? ?
??
? 。
??
。 。 ?
??
???? ????? ? ? ?
16.31 * 0.354本83.15 * 0.456本
0.158 * 
*: average of upper 38 leaders P. A.: Prefectural Assembly 
*ホ averageof 113 leaders C. A.: City Assembly 
Note: Non-weighted sum reputation scores is calculated by following method. 
n 
Pi= i:，Zij 
j~1 
Pi indicates reputation score of Mr. i. 
Zij indicates the score of Mr. i given by Mr. j in the (given-giver) 
matrix of reputation scores. 
Weighted sum of reputation scores is caiculated by following methods. 
n 
Pi=)，-l i:，pjXZij， 
j=1 
indicates eigen values; PxZ=)，・P，
6.42 *キ
Ci=l， 2， 3，.... n) 
n 
)，=i:，Pi 
0.128 * 
Zii=1. 0 
29.90 * 
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are owners of local companies by local capital， and represent local interests except for leader 
No. 2. They are generally against the big national tourist industries such as Tokyu and Seibu， 
but some of them are ready to work with big business if it is in pursuit their own interest. 
There are six Tokyu joint company in the city but none of their president are in top thirty. 
The conservative political leaders in the city are at present the mediators of the existing 
conflicts between local capitals and national big business. 
The present mayor， in June 1984， defeated Liberal Democratic Party (conservative party) 
o伍cialcandidate (No. 11) who was the mayor at that time. The present mayor was a candidate 
of a coalition between the Socialist Party， the Communist Party and the local labor unions. 
Leaders among the top thirty are generally conservative politicians except for this mayor (No. 
1). The ex.mayor fai1ed in his re-election because of his inability to mobilize the resources of 
the conservatives. Progressives (liberals in the U. S. sense) made a coalition to stand against 
the mayor at that time. The program of the coalition was to oppose the economic invasion of 
two big tourist industry companies to protect the interests of the small and family businesses as 
well as the jobs of the laborers， farmers and fishermen， and to re-vitalize local economic 
actlvltIes. 
No. 1 got 9，667 votes and No. 11 got 9，181 votes. The difference of 486 votes means that 
among conservatives there were supporters of No. 1. It is said that Seibu stayed neutral， 
supporting No. 1 only in the last stages. In the last election in 1985 Liberal Democratic Party 
got 20 seats out of 26. Among LDP thereぽ etwo fractions one is supporters of a mayor and 
the other is a ex-mayor. Some of the latter faction secretly supported No. 1. 
Figure 1 isa graph of the political distance between relationships which is given by the 
traits of each person. Each leader was asked to nominate about ten leaders with whom he 
consulted about political matters. According to their answers， we measured the relationship 
between the two leaders under consideration as + 1 if they were nominated by a third leader， 
or if they were not nominated by the same third leader. If one of the two readers were 
nominated by a third leader， but the other was not， we counted the relationship between the 
two as -1. Then we tallied the average scores from these data for each pair of leaders. The 
value would ran 
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Figure 1 Network Map of Politieal Consultant Rel四“0闘 hipsand Reputation Scores. 
These figure are drawn with factor analysis of the correlation of structural equivalence. How to 
draw these五guresis explained as follows; First， we calculate the correlations of structural equivalence 
(Cij) with a next equation. 
n n 
L:Zki2Zkj2L:CZki-1)2(Zkj-1)2-L:Zki2(Zkj-1)2L:Zkj2(Zki-1)2 
Cij=~~l でー一一一一←一一土L一一一ァf壬一一一{孟Zk削t♂2f;(z.叫一1)ア2f;(Zk灯j=1)2f;Zk削)2ヰ十V
、 k包 ~l k~l 厄包 ~l 匙~=1
n: number of actors 
Zij: the relationship from i to j 
Zij=l， ifi has a linkage to j 
Zij=O， ifi hai no linkage t刀 j
-1.0s，.Cij:三+1.0
If i and j have identical relationships with al the actors， Cij=1. 0， while if they have no relationships 
in common， Ci j = -1. O. Second we make factor analysis these coefficients matrix， then plor these actors 
on their factor loading scores ofaxes 1 and 11. 
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Figure 2 Network of Politieal Consultant Relationships and 
the Voting Attitudes of Mayor's Eleetion 
Note: On the above mentioned network map of political consultant relationships， 
the attitudes of the Mayor's election are described. 
plus side. At the center we see a mixture of both， which shows that both candidates were in 
keen competition in the campaign. 
When No. 1 started to run his campaign， a written agreement was made between the 
Socialist Party， the Communist Party and the local unions association， which said: 
Shimoda city where we live now faces great di伍culties. Because of the numerous 
disasters and depression， the economy of our city has been greatly damaged and since 1977 
the population of the city has been declining. 
Under such conditions we should make al efforts to protect the lives of the people 
of Shimoda. The present Administrations that control the city government has been 
standing for the interests of a few rich people and against the interests of the ordinary 
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people for long time. 
The consensus among the citizen about the construction of the community center 
and the problems of water supply has been neglected. 
The present mayor has no concrete policy to conquer the depression or to revitalize 
the local economics and culture and to make Shimoda attractive for its citizen， especial1y 
for the yodnger generation. 
The general goals of the city government we are aiming for are: 
1. To realize the establishment of the self-government of the citizens and to 
protect themselves from the illegitimate interference of the national and prefectural govern-
ments. 
2. To develop indigenous industries such as tourism， commerce， agriculture and 
the forest and :fishery industries. 
3. To establishe a peaceful Shimoda that is able to declare itself ‘a non-neuclear 
city' and to make the Constitution useful in our everyday lives. 
Candidate No. 1 accepted this agreement and expresed his willingness to practice it. As 
for the basic problems of the city he suggested cal1ing a convention on the organization of 
‘An association to vita1ize Shimoda.' Thus a lose coalition was made between candidate No. 1 
and the progressive elements. 
After he got the position of a mayor， No. 1 faced di伍cultiesin carring out his policies 
as a progressive candidate of a coalition. Above al1， two issues which the new mayor had 
inherited from the ex-mayor caused trouble. One was the confiict brought on by the renovation 
of a big supermarket downtown， and the other was the issue of the construction of a community 
center. We will see these two issues in the next chapter. 
IV. The Issues and the Decision Making 
The :first of the two issues we will discuss is the confiict between the branch of a chain 
of supermarkets in the Shizuoka prefecture and the local retailors in downtown Shimoda. 
Already a relatively big supermarket built in 1977 by Tokyu， caused some troubles between 
Tokyu and the local retailors. 1n 1979 another supermarket a伍liatedto a prefectural bus 
company folded owing to the economic slump. A department store company (Y) which already 
owned two stores in the town bought the stocks of the supermarket from the bus company 
and tried to reopen it in January 1983. 
The Association of Shopkeepers which consist of unions of vegetable and fruit stores， of 
:fish shops， butchers， wine shops and restaurants and others made the Citizen' Association 
prevent the opening of this third branch. A chronological history of the events is as fol1ows; 
Feb. 28， 1983 Y department storeproposed negotiation to the Citizen's Association. 
March 2 The Citizen's Association submitted a petition to freeze the reopening 
March 29 
April 12 
April 20 to May 9 
April 30 
May 9 
Feb. 28， 1984 
plan. 
The resolution for freezing the plan was adopted in the City Assembly. 
Sit-in movement to prevent the remodeling construction. 
A blockade by the Association of Shopkeepers (ASK). 
An election of the city assembly. 
Y store stated that they would start negotiation with ASK. The 
blockade was resolved. 
The Mayor (No. 11)， the chairman of the city assembly and the 
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president of the Chamber of Commerce presented a compromise plan， 
which proposed to postpone the reopening til1 May 1985. 
A decision was made to postpone the reopening til1 April 1987 by 
mayor. 
The new mayor's inauguration. 
The mayor met the Y store executives. Y store declared that the con-
struction would start in early February. 
The construction was started， the mayor's proposition was ignored， 
and Y store declared it would reopen on March 20th. 
The mayor answered the assembly that it was impossible to postpone 
the reopening， however it was our fruit not to make reopen within 
two years. 
Y store is now open. 
On February 19， 1985 the president of the Citizen's Association， the president of the 
Fishmongers Union， the president of the Union of vegetable shops， the president of the butchers 
Union， the president of the Japanese Liquor Shops Union and the president of the Re旬il
Association made fol1owing statement; 
Dear president of Y store， 
Mayor wil1 be arrested by the police because he said he would prevent by force the 
reopening of your store. 
From February 16， you began construction on the building ignoring the orders to stop by 
the mayor， the president of Chamber of Commerce and the chairman of the City Assembly. 
The mayor asked Y store to obey the mediation that froze the re-opening til1 April 30， 
1987; and he declared that if Y -store were to continue construction， he would take drastic 
measures， even to the point of risking arrest by the police... . 
However this strong threat was hol1ow， and Y store prospered immediately upon its 
reopening. A matter such as the reopening of Y store， isnot one that should be decided 
political1y. It was an economic invasion by Y company under the disguise of the reopening of 
an old supermarket. It should not have been an issue for the city assembly or mayor. One 
of the reasons why this became a political issue was that both the mayor and city assembly 
elections were held and conservative politicians were forced to pretend to support the demands 
of the smal1 scale merchants. The Association of Citizens was mainly composed of these 
merchants who did not necessarily represent the universal interests of al1 the citizens. The 
people in the downtown area are pleased with the reopening of the department store. 
On this issue， the 113 leaders were asked ‘with whome did you discuss the Y store 
issue? Please select about ten persons from the list of 113 leaders.' Then they were asked to 
express their attitude towards the immediate reopening of Y store. Both the mayor and the 
ex-mayor expressed their disapproval. The tendency of al1 the leaders， ifa simple average is 
calculated， was for approval of the immediate reopening. But when we take into account the 
leaders' degree of centrality in the network of issue consultant relationship and their weighted 
reputation scores， the weighted average of their attitudes turns out to be the inverse， that is， 
on the side of disapprova1. Nevertheless， ifwe were to assume that not just the mayor but 
also the ex-mayor were to change their attitudes to the approval sid 
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From this evidence， we can say that in the free market the resolution to the issue of 
the reopening could have been reached rather spontaneously. Even if political leaders such as 
the mayor and the assembly men could mediate between the two coflicting elements， they could 
only do so by postponing the reopening. They could'nt stop Y store indefinitely. 
The second issue concerns the construction of the community center-the location and 
the style of building. Originally the plan to build the center was submitted by a majority of 
citizens. In the beginning of the 1970's the mayor at that time (No. 11) asked the Council of 
Tourist Accommodations to look into the matter. In 1975 the Council submitted their report 
in which they recommended building the community center. However the city government 
shelved the report. In 1980 the controIling stockholder of a pharmaceutical company (No. 2) 
proposed giving a donation for the construction of the center with one of their conditions 
being that Kashima Construction Company would be given the contract. Because of these 
conditions， the city government did not accept the proposal. In 1981 the city government 
decided to build the center not taking advantage of the donation. It also decided the location 
of the center. However the plan was not put into action because of the disagreement among 
a wide range of citizens over the place and size and the style of the bui1ding. In September 
1985， the council recommended the center be located in downtown Shimoda， which also had 
been the mayor's campaign promises. But the the city assembly has not made a final decision 
yet. 
Our survey concerning the city hall problems was done in November in 1984. At that 
time the only information avairable to the citizens was the mayor's campaign statement. To 
examine the conditions on which the mayor's community cener proposition could be accepted， 
the attitudes and the network of the consultanting relationships of the leaders about this issue 
were researched. The leaders are asked ‘With whom have you consulted on this issue? Please 
mention the names of ten persons.' The data on the leaders' attitudes toward the mayor's 
community center plans were col1ected in terms of pro.， undecided and con. From these results， 
we would like to suggest the possibility of a resolution to this issue. In order to separate 
these three attitudes， the following operation procedures were chosen; 
1) It was decided that in thi 
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Table 7 Conditional Analysis of Problem Resolutional Potentialities 
Place (1) uncon 
A'C H'C M' C A'D A' 1 A+I+M Style dition 
MX1 (1) 0.1604 0.1604 0.1604 0.1604 0.1604 0.1604 0.1604 
(2) -0.1972 -0.2064 -0.2064 -0.2064 -0.2037 -0.1972 -0.1972 
MX2 (1) 0.1189 0.1198 0.1198 0.1198 0.1245 0.1198 0.1198 
(2) -0.1587 一 0.1679 -0.1679 -0.1651 -0.1648 -0.1587 -0.1587 
MX3 (1) 0.3037 0.3037 0.3037 0.3037 0.3404 0.3130 0.3171 
(2) 0.2030 -0.1438 0.1309 0.1545 0.0425 0.2209 0.2310 
MX4 (1) 0.2475 0.2475 0.2475 0.2475 0.3098 0.2651 0.2686 
(2) 0.1829 -0.1879 0.0516 0.1423 -0.0181 0.2020 0.2112 
MX5 (1) 0.4202 0.4202 0.4204 0.4204 0.4721 0.4388 0.4477 
(2) 0.3321 -0.3248 0.1381 0.2683 -0.0463 0.3640 0.3761 
R P (1) 0.9204 0.9204 0.9204 0.9204 0.9720 0.9388 0.9477 
(2) 0.8321 0.1752 0.6381 0.7683 0.4537 0.8640 0.8761 
V (1) 0.2944 0.2944 0.2944 0.2944 0.3282 0.3021 0.3000 
(2) 0.2754 0.3046 0.1863 0.2652 0.1952 0.2775 0.2808 
TV 0.5698 0.5990 0.4811 0.5595 0.5234 0.5796 O.日09
Note: A. C. means “if Mr. A stands against the style issue，" A. P. means “if Mr. A stands for the style issue，" 
A.D. means ‘if Mr. A is undecisive.' -mark indicates negative values. A+I means loose coalition when 
Mr. A and Mr. 1 nominate each other as a consultant mate concerning with the issue. I+R=T means 
that Mr. R and Mr. T are in terms of tight coalition between themselves on one hand and that Mr. 1 and 
both of them are in terms of loose coalition on the other. 
MXl (一 5~玉MX1~玉+. 5) indicates simple means over pro. & con. attitudes of local community leaders 
towards the issues of the city hall construction concerning with the place and style of building (X1). 
MX2 (一.5;;;;MX2主五十.5) indicates means over the X1 multiplied by the degree of interest which local 
community leaders cherish towards the issue general (X2). 
MX3 (一.5;;;;MX3~玉+. 5) indicates means over the X2's multiplied by the degrees of centrality of local 
nominated as consultants concerning to the issue of the city hall construction (X3). As to calculating of 
the degree of centrality in the network of consultant relationships emergent from the issue， see Table 3. 
MX4 (一.5;;;;MX4豆+.5) indicates means over the X3's multiplied by degrees of power which local com. 
munity leaders expect themselves mutually to consume for the resolution of the city hall construction 
issues concerning with the place and style of building (X4). The degree of power is derived from the 
6) It was decided that the attitude of each of the 113 leaders is reciprocally insuenced 
by the degree of their own centrality. The degree of centrality is shown as the score of a 
leader who is expected by others to mobilize their general resources as indicated by the weighted 
reputation scores in proportion to their own demands by which we mean the strength of the 
leader's desire regardless of pro. or con. for the solutions of these specific problems. 
7) We assume that the attitude of al the 113 leaders is insuenced by the degree of the 
leader's desire for a solution to the two problems. It is supposed that the degree of desire for 
a solution of the two problems by the whole group of 113 leaders will be formed in proportion 
to the degree of centrality in mutual expectation. 
From these procedures， we developed five types (MXl， MX2， MX3， MX4， MX5， see 
Table 7) of average value regarding the attitudes towards these problems: and charted the 
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About the City Hall Construetion in the Reformed Theory of C. P. S. 
A'C 
I+R 
A'D 
I+R 
A'C 
K'P 
A'C， K'P 
K+I 
A'C 
S.p 
A・C，S.P A・C A・C，K'P，S'P
S+I K'P， S.P K+S+I 
0.1604 
-0.1972 
0.1198 
-0.1624 
0.3073 
-0.1410 
0.2523 
-0.1973 
0.4234 
-0.3237 
0.9234 
0.1763 
0.2980 
0.3048 
0.6028 
0.1604 
-0.1944 
0.1245 
-0.1593 
0.3437 
0.0461 
0.3143 
-0.0169 
0.472氾
-0.0429 
0.9728 
0.4571 
0.3324 
0.1964 
0.5288 
0.1604 
-0.1972 
0.1198 
-0.1587 
0.3037 
-0.1425 
0.2475 
-0.1970 
0.4204 
-0.3223 
0.9204 
0.1777 
0.2944 
0.3055 
0.5999 
0.1604 
-0.1972 
0.1198 
-0.1587 
0.3077 
-0.1356 
0.2565 
-0.1789 
0.4261 
-0.3089 
0.9261 
0.1911 
0.3011 
0.2896 
0.5907 
0.1604 
-0.1972 
0.1198 
-0.1605 
0.3037 
0.0989 
0.2475 
-0.1658 
0.4204 
-0.2786 
0.9204 
0.2214 
0.2944 
0.2976 
0.5920 
0.1604 
-0.1972 
0.1198 
-0.1605 
0.3083 
-0.0806 
0.2581 
-0.1468 
0.4229 
-0.2539 
0.9229 
0.2462 
0.3051 
0.2892 
0.5943 
0.1604 
-0.1881 
0.1198 
-0.1514 
0.3037 
-0.0976 
0.2475 
-0.1650 
0.4204 
-0.2764 
0.9204 
0.2236 
0.2944 
0.2985 
0.5928 
0.1604 
-0.1881 
0.1198 
-0.1514 
0.3126 
-0.0673 
0.2618 
-0.1130 
0.4284 
-0.2004 
0.9284 
0.2997 
0.3056 
0.2日H9
0.5875 
following set of equations (Z=IX3IxR， V=PXIX31， P=VxR >ーPXz=わ<P).Z indicates matrix of the 
degree's of mutual expectation according to which local community leaders of the degree's of mutual 
expectation according to which local community leaders would consume their own power for the resolution 
of the city hall construction issue. P indicates vector of the degree's of power of which local community 
leaders could dispos巴. R indicates vector of the reputation scores which local community leaders give 
each other according to their images of their leaderships. 
V indicates vector of the degree's of demaud for resolution of the city hall construction issues. 
MX5 (一 5;:三MX5孟+.5) indicates means over the X4's divided by the degree of demand above mentioncd 
(X5). 
RP (. 0;:三RP孟+1.0) indicates the degree's of potentiality according to which the city hall cousructin 
problems could be resolved by local community leaders. 
TV (. O~三TV~玉+1. 0) indicate total demand for resolution of the city hall construction issue. 
Mr. A is No.11， ex.mayor. Mr. 1 isNo.1， mayor. Mr. H is No.6， president of chamber of commerce. Mr. 
K is No.4， owner of construction Co. Mr. M is young active leader. Mr. R is chairman of the council 
of the ccity hal. Mr. S is No. 24， president of tourist bureau. 
degree of potential resolution to the community center construction problems by local com-
munity leaders (RP)， and the strength of desire for a solution of the problems (TV). We 
focused on the architectural style of the center building. 1n the case of the uncondition 
procedure， the mayor's proposition would be rejected by the leaders. According to the forth 
procedure， even when the interests of the leaders were taken into account the mayor's propo・
sition was sti1l rejected by them. But according to the fifth and sixth and seventh procedures， 
his proposition was accepted. Thus it seemed that his proposition would be accepted if in the 
real decision making process their weighted reputation scores， total demands for the solution 
and their own degree of centrality in this issue's network of consultant relationships could be 
taken into account. 
1n the case of the conditional procedure number two， itwas decided that the ex-mayor 
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would change his attitude to con. The mayor's proposition would be rejected if the procedures 
from four to seven were taken into account. But using the procedure number three as well 
as number two， when No. 4 and the mayor had a close mutual consultant relationships on this 
issue consultant and No. 4 could changed his opinion to pro.， the mayor's proposition would 
only be rejected to a slightly less extend than otherwise. Even though the reputation rank of 
the ex-mayor is only No. 11， he could be intimate with No. 4 and the mayor (No. 1) and the 
fact that the mayor's proposition would be less likely to be accepted under the disapproval of 
the ex-mayor shows the high potential power of the ex-mayor on such issues as the construction 
plan of the community center. However， we must limit our conjecture to those simulation 
procedures， because the ex-mayor retired from the world of politics after that election. 
V. Network and Power Structure 
In this chapter we would 1ike to analyse the community power structure through the 
network of 113 leaders. 113 leaders have many relationships about many matters， and from 
these relationships we can make network maps about each matter. At first， we asked，‘among 
your contacts with whom do you consult about important political issues concerning the whole 
city district or your local community， please nominate ten persons.' From this data we made 
a network map of political consultants. Next we asked，‘please nominate ten persons with 
whom you talk intimately.' From this question we made a network map of friendships. Thirdly 
we asked about the problems of the community center ‘with whom have you consulted on the 
issue of the construction of community center? Please list ten persons.' From this we made 
a network map of consultant relationships concerning of the center. 
The network map of political consultant relationships is shown in Figure 3. The calcu-
lation of the distance between the positions of each leader in the map has already been 
explained in Chapter 3. In this Figure we added lines between leaders when at least one of 
both leaders nominated the other. Attention should be paid to the fact that the close distance 
between two leaders itseH reveals a close relationship. From this Figure we can observe that 
the selection of political consultants does not necessarly mean a closed po1itical distance between 
the two. The line is drawn between close points but it can also be drawn between points 
that are greatly separated from each other. 
On a matrix according to their answers about friendships， we scored the relationship 
between nominee and nominator + 1.0 when the two leaders nominated each other， or were 
nominated as an intimate friend by the same third leader. We calculated the relationship 
between the two -1. 0 when one of the two leaders was nominated by a third leader but not 
the other one. Then we took the average score from these data for every pair of leaders. 
The value would range from -1. 0 to + 1.O. Then we calculated al the relationships between 
each of the 113 leaders， and made our matrix. From this matrix we printed out each 
leaders' average value in rows shu但edto show the degree of closeness to a common pa悦ern
of friendship relationships. Thus when a leader's value is + 1.0， we can assume he has a 
normal pattern of relationships， and when a leader's value is -1. 0， we can assume 
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friends by conservative ideological criteria， and those on the left by progressive. On the vertical 
axis， we can say that the leaders on the upper side choose friends on a particularistic criteria 
and the persons on the down side chose friends on a universalistic criteria. 
As shown in Figure 4， in the right and upper quadrant we find the al the politically 
powerful leaders except No. 1 and No. 12. This means that the conservative leaders have 
steady and normal pattern of relationships characterized by particularistic and traditional ones 
corresponding with vertical patronage and service relations. On the left side we find the pro. 
gressive leaders. For example， we find No. 27 (the Communist city assembly member) and the 
other union leaders. No. 1， the mayor is on this side. On the lower side we find the leaders 
who are members of the Junior Chamber of Commerce and the informal leaders of the Shimoda 
??????『 ??• 
0.5 ??
?
「?-l.0 
-0.5 
-1.0 
Figure 3 Network Map of Political Consultant Relationships 
Note: As to the method of drawing日gures，see Figure 1. 
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Revitalizing Festival. 
Fi思ue5 shows the network map of friendship relationships plotted with the voting 
patterns from the mayor's election. This figure shows a high corelationship between friendship 
relationships and voting attitudes. This corelationship is even higher than that between political 
consultant relationships and voting attitudes. Most of the leaders of the young generation who 
have nontraditional criteria for their selection of friends also supported the mayor. 
We made Figure 6， by drawing a line between leaders when at least one of the leaders 
nominated the other. The conservatives who are shown on the right side of Figure 2 are 
situated in the upper right quadrant of Figure 6， and in this latter figure we can see a clique 
of interrelationship which did not appe釘 inthe former. This means that the conservative 
-1.0 
nl!7 
0 一
じ、
-0，5' ~ 
1.01l 
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0.5 
-0.5 
-1.0 
Figu~e 4 Network Map of Friend ReIationships and Reputation Seores 
Note: As to the method of drawing五gures，see Figure 1. 
I 
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leaders have traditional diffuse friendships. Figure 3 shows that they have consultant relation-
ships beyond their political stances. Figure 6 shows that al the 113 leaders can be divided 
into three sub-groups in which a similarity of voting patterns can be seen. This would indicate 
that the network of friendship relationships would be latently determined by the political 
consultant relationships. As shown in Figure 6 there are some mildly scattered influential 
leaders among the conservatives who have similar friendship relationships patterns. The pro-
gressives who are shown on the left side of Figure 3， are situated on the left side of Figure 
6， and in the latter case we can recognize a clear distinction between some radicals such as 
members of the communist and socialist parties and the union leaders on the one hand， and 
some liberals such as the substantial supporters of the mayor on the other. On the lower side 
-1.0 i 
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Figure 5 Network Map of Friend Relationships and 
the Voting Attitudes of Mayor's Eleetion 
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of Figure 6， we find the independent friendship pa抗ernof younger business generation. 
From these analyses we can tentatively conclude that the network of friendship relation-
ships may reflect the basis of the community power s仕ucturemore accurately than that of 
political consultant relationships. The fact that leaders who share the same pattern of friendship 
relationships are in close networks of political consultant relationships demons仕atesthat cultural 
and normative factors are determinants in the political power structure of the community of 
Shimoda. 
To make Figure 7 we calculated the degree of closeness to the common pattern of 
consultant relationships regarding the community center issue. When a leader's value is + 1.0， we 
assume he has a normal pa悦ernof relationships， and when it is -1. 0， he has a unique pattern. 
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Figure 6 Network Map of Friend Relationships 
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As to the horizontal axis， we find the leaders who have old influential consultants such as No. 
7 and No. 29 on the right side， and those who have many active consultants regardless of their 
political distances on the left side. As to the vertical axis， we find leaders who are politically 
conservative on the upper side and those who are politicaIly progressive and culturally pres・
tigious on the lower side. 
At the center of the network map， there is the mayor's cliques containing No. 12 (who 
ranks fifth in political consultant centrality， and who is a relative of No. 2) and the chairman 
of the council for the construction of the community center. In this network an ex-mayor 
(who ranks first in consultant centrality on this issue)， No. 5， No. 6 and No. 16 have the same 
attitude towards the style of the city hall， and belonging to one cIique， and are distant from 
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the mayor's c1ique and others. The attitudes of the 113 leaders towards the style of the 
community center which are plotted in the network map are irrespective of their inter relation-
ships. As to the style， Z indicates pro. for its exc1usive use as a theater， Y indicates con. 
From this Figure we only san say that it is very di伍cultto reach a definite conc1usion 
concerning to the style. Both of the mayor and the exmayor釘 epro. wanting a theater， but 
the actual realization of a center depends on the drift of the clique of the ex-mayor and others. 
Figure 8 is a network map of consultant relationships about the community center issue. 
From this Figure， the concentration to the mayor's clique and others can be discerned. Such 
a concentration has not been seen in the other network maps (see， Figure 3 and Figure 6)， 
which means that the resolution of this issue is adminis甘ative. Nevertheless it is a fact that 
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there is no talented advister around the mayor to prevent him from resolving this issue 
exclusively on his administrative initiative. There is another clique of local intelligentsia and 
political progressives which is situated at the opposite extreme from the above mentioned clique 
of the ex-mayor and others. In short we concluded that four cliques representative of the 
sub-groups would emerge from the resolution of this issue and that these four cliques would 
be in balance temporarily. We believe that the dynamics of these four cliques are 1釘 gely
limited by the commnnity power structure in Shimoda city. 
VI. Conclusion 
Among power structure researchers in the U. S.， there have been debates on whether an 
elite model or a pluralistic model is suitable for the analysis of the actual structure of power 
in American society both on national level and local community levels. However in the U. S.， 
genぽalre1iance on American democracy characterizes al arguments on power structure. Even 
those who describe American society as one that is now ruled by a handful of omnipotent 
e1ite also count on the restorative potentiality of American democracy. 
In ]apan the people's sovereignty was rea1ized only after World War I. Under the 
emperor's sovereignty in the pre-war period， the emperor formally ruled the ]apanese nation 
and society. In rural areas at that time， landlords exploited tenant farmers and ruled the 
village communities. In contrast to the relationship between capitalists and laborers， the 
relationship between landlords and tenant was based in a so1id status system. Exploitation by 
landlords of tenants was visible. Tenants brought bags of rice which they produced to the 
storehouses of the landlords by themselves. Also in the village community， landlords dominated 
not only the tenants but also farmer owners by holding the rights to use of communal 
resources such as irrigation and waste land. Also they stood at the apex of the hierarchy 
based on land ownership. 
After the war， this landlord system had been dissolved by the land reform. People were 
given equal rights including voting rights. However even under the new Constitution the 
emperor stil has a s1ightly privileged position. According to the new Constitution， the emperor 
is the symbol of the state and of the unity of the people， and his position is to be succeeded 
by his eldest son. Traditionally primogeniture is the predominant pattern of the succession in 
the land ownership of the household. Even today， the graves of a typical ]apanese family is a 
family owned grave， and those who lie in the same grave are kinsmen of direct descendant 
and their wives. Those of collatoral descendant are expected to establish new graves of their 
own， and they are succeeded again by their eldest son. This rule of succession is just the 
same as that of the position of the emperor. In ]apan equa1ity under the law does not 
e玄cludethe dominance of males over females， the eldest son over the other sons nor the 
direct descendant over collatoral descendants. 
As to the community power st 
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nant in national and local politics. At the national level， members of Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) occupy the majority of the Diet seat. This conservative p訂 tyhas come into power as 
the agent of big business. However LDP candidates in local electoral districts are not necessarily 
supported by big business in those districts. Big business supports LDP on the national level 
to maintain the present order against counterforces. But this does not mean it always supports 
al LDP members. There are many particularistic conditions in the innumerable local government. 
A controling stock owner of big pharmaceutical company in Shimoda， for example， isnot much 
interested in the political a妊airsof that city. 
Also in ]apan， conservatives are not capitalistic conservates but traditional ones. But 
traditional communal relationships are not necessarily connected with the hierarchy relation-
ships. Non-industrial society has， not only vertical relationships but also horizontal communal 
relationships. It is the conservative elements who try to revitalize the vertical relationships in 
order to maintain capitalistic social order. On the other hand， radicals seek to mobi1ze 
horizontal relationships in order to realize authentic self-government. Shimoda's case shows 
that in local elections it is quite possible to realize anti-LDP coalitions under the conditions in 
which conservatives have an overwhelming influence. 
When we discuss about class struggle or class domination， we must take notice of the fact 
that in modern society we are not ablo to visualize the rulling class. Also these is no clear 
distinction between the capitalist class and the laborer class. Of course， there is a clear visual 
distinction between the rich and the poor. But this distinction is based on quantitative differences 
not on qualitative. Also logically the ruling class is not the same as the rich nor the ruled is 
the poor. However the hierarchical order based on money ownership functions in fact favorably 
for the governing class. Therefore inequality in economic resources is one of the most 
important factors， and under conditions of legal equality， the capitalist class which has the 
means of production is able to be the governing class and to enjoy their power. 
As we mentioned earlier， even in a small local town like Shimoda where the conservative 
party has centralized power (f訂 fromthe pluralistic model) and operates a d 
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the same conditions that existed in the village community， in the prewar period， 3) after the 
opening of the 1zukyu railroad， contradictions between the domination of the big businesses 
and the traditional elements， 4) and now people in Shimoda stand at the crossroards of whether 
to follow futher modernization pressed for by big business or clarify， an alternative life style 
and protect people's lives. 
1n Japan the rule of big business has developed side by side with the rule of a centralized 
power along the lines of the traditional emperor's system. To stand against such one dimen-
sional control， those who live in the local community and cherish indigenous values must 
rea1ize political and cultural pluralism through the strong self-government. 
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地域社会の権力構造の分析は，これまで主としてアメリカでおこなわれてきたが，本稿はそれを日本
の一地方小都市でおこなった。その結果，アメリカでコミュニティという地域単位でパワーをもってい
る人がビジネスマンであるのにたいし，日本の小都市でパワーをもっている人と地元の人びとからみな
されているのは，政治家や議員が多く，日本の地域社会では民間人はパワー(権力〉をもつものとみな
されていないことがわかった。また，日本の小都市では地域のまとまりは，町内会・部落会などの単位
でみられるのであって，とくに農村部では大字ないし部落(区〉が重要であって，重要な決定も行政の
次元とは独自に部落でなされることが多い。日本は資本主義の発達にもかかわらず， I日い共同体的関係
が残っていて，それが地域の権力構造を大きく左右している。
Key Words (キー ワー ド〉
地域社会 (Community)，権力 (Power)，政策決定 (DesisionMaking)，ネ'1トワー ク (Network)
